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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

Respondent,
Case No.
8504

-vs.EUGENE MYERS,

Appellant.

Respondent's Brief
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Eugene Myers was charged in a complaint signed
by T. A. Callicott, charging the appellant with grand
larceny. The complaint was filed July 1, 1954. With his
counsel the appellant was present in the chambers of
examining magistrate where he answered to his true
name, received a copy of the complaint and thereafter
personally waived preliminary hearing (R. 2). At this
time the court bound the defendant over to the District
Court. On the same day Eugene Myers was arraigned in
the District Court, and with counsel present, entered a
plea of guilty to the charge of grand larceny (R. 5).
1
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The State then moved to dismiss the original complaint
filed against the apellant charging him with armed robbery, the grand larceny complaint having been substituted when appellant agreed to enter a guilty plea.
On July 21, 1954, upon the motion of appellant and
based on an affidavit filed by him, the court allowed
appellant to withdraw his guilty plea and enter a plea
of not guilty, a new trial date being set. Alan Swan, the
first of five court appointed attorneys, withdrew as counsel July 31, 1954 (R. 31). On October 4, 1954, Donn E.
Cassity was appointed counsel; the next day he submitted his withdrawal (R. 32). That same day James E.
Houston was appointed counsel and on October 7th he
was allowed to withdraw. On October 26th, Lee Hobbs
was appointed counsel for appellant. During the month
of September 1954, upon motion of the appellant, the
District Attorney furnished two separate bills of particular concerning the charge against appellant. On January
13, 1955, the court set the date for trial as March 15, 1955.
On March 7, 1955, Mr. Hobbs was released from an order
issued by Judge Lewis Jones, which required him to
perfect an appeal on the denial of a writ of habeas
corpus and also released him from subpoenaing certain witnesses named by the defendant as being material
(R. 46-51). On :March 8, l~l33, a minute order was made
by Judge Jones regarding the Eugene :Myers writ of
habeas corpus, which minute entry made all of his orders
subject to modification by the Criminal Division of the
Third District Court ( R. 50).
2
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Upon the court's motion on March 11, 1955, two doctors were designated to examine the appellant as to his
sanity. After the examination the doctors recommended
to the court that the appellant be sent to the State Hospital in Provo for a thirty day observation period
(R. 58-60). On April 7, 1955, Dr. Owen P. Heninger,
Superintendent of the State Hospital, in a letter addressed to Judge Ellett, said that based upon the thirty
day observation it was the opinion of Dr. Heninger and
his staff that Mr. Myers was in need of hospitalization.
He also indicated that it would be inadvisable for Myers
to attend the sanity hearing because of the adverse effects
it might have upon him (R. 62). On April 8, 1955, Judge
Ellett ordered that a :final hearing regarding the sanity
of appellant be held April 18, 1955. Based upon the information presented at the hearing, the court entered an
order committing Myers to the hospital until his sanity be
restored (R. 67).
On October 26, 1955, the court entered an order, the
Superintendent of the Hospital having certified appellant
to be sane, that he be transferred back to the Salt Lake
County Jail and there await trial (R. 71 and 73). On
~ ovember 16, 1955, appellant appeared in court, where
he was informed that the trial had been set for November 25, 1955, the court having appointed as counsel, Mr.
Wayne Ashworth. On November 19, 1955, the court ordered that appellant's motion for continuance of trial
be denied (R. 75). Also on November 22, 1955, the court
3
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ordered that Mr. Ashworth's motion to withdraw be
denied (R. 76). On November 25, 1955, the appellant did
come to trial before Judge Ray VanCott, Jr., the appellant appearing in person and being represented by Mr.
Ashworth. In the absence of the jurors, the court informed the appellant that Mr. Ashworth, who had been
appointed to defend him, would be present to assume this
responsibility if the appellant so desired, and also informed the appellant that if he proceeded as he had
threatened to do, to sing the "Star Spangled Banner"
and otherwise disrupt the court, that the appellant would
be confined to the Judge's chambers while the trial proceeded (R. 134). Prior to the calling of the State's witnesses, the defendant requested that he be permitted to
change his plea from "not guilty" to "not guilty by reason of insanity" (R. 136). At this time the court asked
him if the appellant wished to enter the defense of insanity and appellant indicated that he didn't claim to be
insane; he didn't want the defense of insanity; he just
merely wanted to enter the plea of not guilty by reason
of insanity (R. 136).
During the colloquy between the court and

~Ir.

:Jiyers

(R. 136 to 139) appellant kept insisting that he wanted
Ashworth to withdraw because he claimed that Ashworth
would not be able to help him rereiYe a fair trial, the
Judge at all times insisting that Ashworth would be present to offer advice and assistance whenever appellant
desired unless the appellant actually discharged ::\Ir. Ash4
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worth. At the request of the appellant all witnesses were
excluded (R. 144).
The first witness called by the State was Wayne
Luck, one of the persons from whom the property in
question had been stolen (R. 148). Mr. Luck testified
that he was in the company of Mr. Dean Jones, Miss Rose
Arlene Thompson and a Miss Joan Reser early on the
morning of March 29, 1954. While thus gathered together in the motel, two masked men entered the cabin
and forced Mr. Luck and Mr. Jones to stand with their
faces against the wall and thereafter stripped from
each man's wrist a watch and took from each man a
wallet. Mr. Luck also had taken from him his glasses
(R. 150-151).
The next witness called on behalf of the State was
Mr. Marion F. Barnett, a police officer from Twin Falls,
Idaho. He testified that March 30, 1954, he stopped a
car which was being driven by the appellant because of a
request from the Salt Lake City police department that
the Idaho police forces be on the lookout for that car
(R. 185). After the arrest the appellant was taken to the
Police Station at Twin Falls and a search disclosed that
he was carrying a plastic bag tied around his waist
which contained two watches and a small revolver
(R. 185). Mr. Barnett identified the watches that had
been placed in evidence as those recovered from the
defendant in Twin Falls, one of the watches also having
been identified by Mr. Luck as the one stripped from his
wrist on the night of March 29th (R. 186).
5
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The State's next witness was a Mr. Spencer Duffin.
Mr. Duffin testified that he was the owner of a motor
lodge called the Maple Motel. He testified to the fact
that he had seen the appellant on March 29, 1954 at his
motel, accompanied by a girl (R. 201). The girl entered
his office and rented the cabin, said cabin being the one
in which the two wallets taken from Luck and Jones
were found the day after the robbery (R. 210).
Mr. Max B. MeHenry was the next witness called on
behalf of the State. Mr. McHenry testified that he was a
deputy sheriff of Salt Lake County. It was he, accompanied by Mr. T. A. Callicott, that returned the appellant
and his companions from Idaho to Utah (R. 208). He
also testified that the watches and gun that had been
placed in evidence were received from the Idaho Falls
Police and had been transported by him to Salt Lake City
(R 208).
The State's next witness was Rose Arlene Thompson.
Miss Thompson testified that she had met ~Ir. Luck and
Mr. Jones during the late afternoon of ~I arch 28, 1955,
and that she remained in their company proceeding from
one tavern to another during the rest of the evening
(R. 224). When Luck and Jones returned ~Iiss Thompson to her home, she discovered a note requesting that
she come to the Nelson Motor Lodge, the note being
signed by ''Gene.'' Luck and Jones drove l\Iiss Thompson to the motor lodge, and after she had consulted with
the occupant of the cabin, she invited both of the men
in for a few drinks ( R. 225). This was approximately
6
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12 :30 on the morning of March 29, 1954. After the men
and Miss Thompson had been at the cabin for approximately an hour, two masked men entered the cabin, one
holding a gun (R. 226). At their command Jones and
Luck took the position facing the wall and were then relieved of their watches and wallets, and in the case of Mr.
Luck, his glasses. Miss Thompson testified at this time
that she recognized the appellant's voice (R. 227). Miss
Thompson testified that later during the same day
she was in the company of Miss Reser, the appellant
and another man, and at that time saw watches and wallets similar to the ones taken from Jones and Luck when
she, along with the other persons named, were at the
Maple Motor Lodge (R. 233).
The next witness for the State was Jay Emer
Nelson, owner of the Nelson Motor Lodge, the place where
the robbery took place. Mr. Nelson testified that he saw
the defendant enter the cabin the one in which Luck and
Jones were robbed, on March 28, 1954, and felt that he
could make a positive identification because he had seen
the defendant several times prior to that date and had
seen the defendant enter the same cabin (R. 312).
Mr. Myers then took the stand and testified in his
own defense substantially as follows. Appellant claimed
that at the time the robbery was committed he was either
at a movie or at the Porters and Waiters Club (R. 330).
He says that he was requested by Miss Thompson and
.:\Iiss Reser to drive them to Boise and took the job because they had offered him $75.00 to do so (R. 333). His

7
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claim is that while they were traveling towards Boise the
girls asked him to take the bag in which the watch and
gun were contained and he did it at their request (R. 335).
He also admits that the watches and the gun were found
on him by the police after his arrest at Twin Falls.
The matter was submitted to the jury which returned
a verdict of guilty of grand larceny. Thereafter, at the
request of the appellant, the court appointed Grover
Giles to help him to perfect his appeal. The date of sentencing was set for December 24, 1955, however, the
appellant was sentenced on December 23, 1955. Mr. Giles
withdrew as counsel and the appellant proceeded on his
own with this appeal.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
APPELLANT WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF ANY
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT WHEREIN IT IS PROVIDED THAT IN A CRI~IIXAL PROSECUTION THE
ACCUSED SHALL HA YE THE RIGHT TO APPEAR
AND DEFEND BY PERSON OR BY COr~"SEL BECAUSE HE HAD THE SERVICES OF SIX CAPABLE AND EXPERIENCED ~-\. TTORNEYS.
POINT II
THE APPELLANT HEREIX \YA8 XOT PLACED
IN JEOPARDY A SECOND TIME \YHE~ THE SECOND COMPLAINT AND INFORJ\IATION WERE
FILED NOR WAS HE PREJUDICED BY THE
COURT'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW APPELLANT TO
8
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AMEND HIS PLEA TO NOT GUILTY BY REASON
OF INSANITY.
POINT III
APPELLANT WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO CONFRONT THE
WITNESSES AGAINST HIM.
POINT IV
APPELLANT WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO COMPEL THE
ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES IN HIS OWN BEHALF.
POINT V
THE VERDICT AND JUDGMENT IS NOT CONTRARY TO THE LAW AND EVIDENCE AND DOES
NOT VIOLATE THE APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF ANY
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT WHEREIN IT IS PROVIDED THAT IN A CRIMINAL PROSECUTION THE
ACCUSED SHALL HAVE THE RIGHT TO APPEAR
AND DEFEND BY PERSON OR BY COUNSEL BECAUSE HE HAD THE SERVICES OF SIX CAPABLE AND EXPERIENCED ATTORNEYS.
9
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On July 1, 1954, appellant appeared in court and
entered a plea of guilty to grand larceny. During all the
proceedings he was represented by an attorney whom
he had retained. The attorney he retained has the reputation of being a good criminal lawyer. After his attorney
had made an investigation of the case he apparently felt
that appellant would be best served by entering a plea of
guilty to grand larceny and this appellant did by stepping
forward and personally entering the guilty plea (R. 5).
Within two weeks after appellant had entered his plea
of guilty he filed with the court an affidavit claiming that
his counsel had coerced him into pleading guilty. This
affidavit was prepared with the assistance of another
attorney and the record does not show for certain whether
he was employed by appellant or appointed by the court.
After the filing of this affidavit both attorneys, the one
originally retained and the second attorney to enter the
case withdrew.
Appellant has ever since tried to proceed upon the
theory of ''unlimited substitution'' of counsel in the
hopes that he could find an attorney willing to take the
case and proceed as appellant directed, doing so without question. This dedication was to be displayed as to
the procedural aspects of the case as well as to the law.
The ''unlimited substitution rule'' devised by appellant
caused the court to appoint two other attorneys each in
turn. It is interesting to note that both of these attorneys apparently filed withdrawals with the court after
the initial intt'rYiew with appellant. Again the court
obliged appellant by appointing another attorney to rep-

10
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resent him. This time it was Mr. Lee Hobbs who, under
the authorization of the court appointment, spent considerable time and effort on behalf of appellant. All of
the attorneys that had been either retained by appellant
or appointed by the court were capable and experienced
in the practice of law.
Included in the record is a letter sent by Mr. Hobbs
to Judge Lewis Jones concerning a hearing held before
Judges Jones and some orders issued by the court at that
time. This letter discloses the handicap Mr. Hobbs was
forced to work under while representing appellant, and
respondent feels the letter would be wholeheartedly endorsed as a factual and true picture of the appellant's
attitude by all the attorneys who had represented him
prior to and since Mr. Hobbs' appointment. Mr. Hobbs
explained to the judge that he had '' * * * had a great
deal of trouble with this case, all of it due to Mr. Myers'
insistence on dictating how the case should be handled in
every detail." Mr. Hobbs goes on and explains the situation in the following words :

'' * * * My immediate concern is with the following problems.
First, the question of Mr. Myers' supposedly necessary witnesses. I did not and do not want to
jeopardize Mr. Myers' position before the court
and so to date have made no record as to my reasons for refusing to obtain Mr. Myers' witnesses.
J\fr. Myers has admitted to me and I am advised
by his former attorney that Myers admitted to him
that these witnesses would say anything that
Myers wanted them to. Further, following our
appearance in your court here in Salt Lake, I went

11
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to see Myers in jail and demanded to know why he
had claimed to want these witnesses after agreeing with me that they would not called. He stated
at that time, without any hesitancy, that he had
made the plea for these witnesses for the sole
purpose of delaying his trial and indicated that
the addresses that he gave for the out of state witnesses would prove fruitless * * * (R. 43).
The appellant having been successful in delaying his
trial by being uncooperative and demanding upon his
counsel, also managed to impress the court in such a
manner that the court, upon its own motion, set up a
mental examination for appellant by the appointment of
two alienists (R 59). Based upon this initial examination appellant was sent to the hospital at Provo for an
observation period of 30 days. At the end of the 30 day
period the Superintendent of the Hospital, in a letter
addressed to Judge Ellett of the Third District Court,
expressed the opinion that appellant was in need of hospitalization. Based upon that letter the court in April of
1955 held a mental hearing and committed appellant to
the hospital until restored to sanity (R. 67). The medical staff at the hospital within a six months period
became increasingly aware of the fact that appellant was
not insane and apparently had cleverly duped them
into believing that he was. Upon certification by the hospital that appellant was sane, he was returned to the
Salt Lake County Jail to await trial (R. 71). At this
time the court appointed another attorney to represent
appellant because Mr. Hobbs had withdrawn. The court
appointed Mr. Wayne Ashworth.

12
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The record of appellant's trial held in November of
1955 contains many statements made by appellant about
his lack of counsel and the fact that Mr. Ashworth was
not prepared nor willing to represent him. However, the
record does not show that Mr. A§_hworth ever in any
way displayed that he was unwilling or unprepared in
this matter. However, he did file a motion for continuance which was denied by the judge. This denial was
within the discretion of the court, wherein Section
77-24-18, U.C.A. 1953, provides that:
''After his plea the defendant shall be entitled to
at least two days to prepare for trial, but the time
for trial shall not be postponed for a longer time
than the court may deem imperative.''
In the cases of State v. Green, 89 Utah 437, 57 P.2d
750; State v. Loughney, 70 Utah 526, 261 P. 606, this
Court has recognized that it is within the discretion of
the trial court to expand or limit the time which the
accused may have to prepare his case between the plea
and the date of trial. The statute provides that two days
is sufficient. In this instance appellant and counsel had
full seven days to prepare for his trial. Courts in other
jurisdictions have held that where the court appoints
an attorney to represent an individual accused of a crime,
except in capital cases, there is sufficient time for preparation where counsel is allowed two days or more. In the
case of People v. Shiffman, 350 Ill. 243, 182 N.E. 760,
the court held that where the accused was on trial for
grand larceny, the defendant's attorney not appearing
and the court assigned him another, there was not sufficient time to prepare for trial where the defendant and
13
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his counsel were allowed only five minutes. In the following cases it was held that defendant had been deprived of counsel where the court had appointed an
attorney to represent the accused on the day of the trial
and then required the accused to stand trial that very
same day. Mc.Arver v. State, 114 Ga. 514, 40 S.E. 779;
Reliford v. State, 140 Ga. 777, 79 S.E. 1128. Even in
capital cases the courts have indicated that two or three
days is sufficient time for preparation, the court objecting
to a forty minute consultation period allowed defendant
his newly appointed attorney in Dunmas v. State, - Okla. Crim. Rep.--, 16 P.2d 886.
The court in denying :Mr. Ashworth's motion to
withdraw, again acted within its discretion. ~lr. Ashworth then was obligated as an officer of the court to
continue and prepare to the best of his ability a case in
defense of the appellant. Judge Ray VanCott, Jr., in
refusing both of the motions made by ~lr. Ashworth
said simply that the case had been continued too often
and that the trial was not going to be delayed any longer.
Therefore, Mr. Ashworth was obligated to be prepared
and be present on the day of the trial, and he did fulfill
his obligation.
On the day of trial, November :25, 1955, the appellant
was present as was Mr. Ashworth. Appellant insisted
that he did not feel or think that ~lr. Ashworth could
guarantee him a fair trial and therefore did not wish
Mr. Ashworth to represent him (R. 136-138, 167-168).
When the court reconvened after the noon recess, the
14
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court again informed appellant that Mr. Ashworth was
there, ready and willing to represent him. The court
questioned appellant as to his reasons for not using
the talents of Mr. Ashworth, and :finally concluding, and
we think very justly so, that appellant had discharged Mr.
Ashworth as his counsel (R. 168). Appellant, though
denying he was acting as his own counsel, had assumed
the burden of cross-examining the witnesses presented by
the State and did a good job of it.
All during the trial appellant kept insisting that he
was being denied counsel, and that therefore his constitutional rights were being violated. This was done always
when the jury was present. After a careful reading of
the record a person could not conclude that appellant had
been denied counsel. His own testimony refutes this.
''The Court : Well I will have to remind you again
that you have persistently refused to have a lawyer until today.
Mr. Myers: Your Honor, I have not. I don't wish
to dispute you. Your Honor, I have asked the
lawyers to exercise the court's orders. On January 13th Judge Jones ordered that a writ of
habeas corpusThe Court: Well now, wait. I am not going into
that. You have spent 18 months going into that.
Mr. Myers: I have not really refused lawyers. I
have refused men who came over and who refused
to carry out the cottrt's orders." (R 360)
It is interesting to contrast this with the sentiments
expressed in Mr. Hobbs' letter to Judge Lewis Jones.
This alone should be almost enough to convince the court

15
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that it was not the attorneys' refusal to represent appell~nt, but rather their objection to trying the case on his
theories. It was the appellant's insistence that the attorl).eys do his bidding that caused the withdrawal of not
only the lawyer he had first hired, but also all five of the
court-appointed counsel. See U. S. v. Gutterma;n, 147
P.2d 540.
Respondent agrees that in the State of Utah the
trial court is under a duty to appoint counsel for an
accused criminal where the criminal is unable to employ
his own. Other jurisdictions, both federal and state,
indicate that though the court is obliged to appoint
counsel initially, the court is not obliged to appoint as
counsel a new attorney each week until the appellant is
satisfied that the man is wholeheartedly behind him and
sincerely believes in his cause. State v. Griffith, 14 N.J.S.
72, 81 Atl. 2d 382 held:
''A person accused of a crime is only entitled to
counsel to aid him in his defense, not to save him
from his voluntary acts.''
Appellant's attempt to dictate to the attorneys the basis
upon which they were to carry on his case, though not an
express discharge of counsel, certainly made it impossible and impractical for the attorneys to continue, and
we believe is equivalent to an actual discharge of counsel. U. 8. v. Gutterman, 147 F.2d 540 states as follows:
''An accused unable to employ an attorney must
accept such counsel as the court assigns unless he
can find a better reason for asking a change than
the fact that the accused does not approve of counsel's judgment or unless the accused chooses to
undertake his own defense.''
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As the record bears out, up to and through the trial
held in November 1955, six competent attorneys were
at one time or other either hired by appellant or appoint-'
ed to represent him. The fact that appellant did not
approve of counsel's judgment is certainly not reason, as
above stated, for him to be allowed time and again to
have the court appoint men under his "unlimited substi-·
tution" rule until he be satisfied. In the case of People v.
Adamson, 210 P.2d 13, 34 C.2d 320, the court held that
a defendant's right to counsel did not include the right
to postpone his trial indefinitely and reject the services'
of competent counsel appointed by the court while the·
defendant, at his leisure, attempted to find counsel who
would serve without charge and whose ideas about the
case were similar to his own. Also in the case of U. S. ex
rel. Mitchell v. Thompson, 56 F. Supp. 683, the court
declared that the court's choice of counsel should not be
subject to impeachment on the ground that the defendant
claimed displeasure with the appointment or that defendant lacked confidence in his attorney. It is only upon a
showing of good cause why the appointment should not
be made that the defendant can expect to receive addi'tional counsel by way of court appointment. Could anyone who has had the services of six capable and experienced attorneys be said to have been denied his right··
to counseU In this case it was only the appellant's obstinate attitude, uncooperativeness and misconception of
the law that denied him the right of counsel, if it ran
be said by the furtherest stretch of the imagination that
he was denied counsel.
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POINT II
THE APPELLANT HEREIN WAS NOT PLACED
lN JEOPARDY A SECOND TIME WHEN THE SECOND COMPLAINT AND INFORMATION WERE
FILED NOR WAS HE PREJUDICED BY THE
COURT'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW APPELLANT TO
AMEND HIS PLEA TO NOT GUILTY BY REASON
OF INSANITY.
It is common practice and I am sure that the court is
aware of it, that in many instances the prosecuting attorneys in this state find it both desirable and expedient to
make an agreement with the accused that upon the
accused's promise to enter a plea of guilty to a lesser
offense included in the offense charged in the information the prosecuting attorney will recommend to the
court that it accept said plea and thereby dismiss the
more serious crime alleged in the information. Section
77-24-8, U.C.A. 1953, provides that:
"The defendant, with the consent of the court and
the prosecuting attorney, may plead guilty to any
lesser offense than that charged which is included
in the offense charged in the information or indictment, or of any lesser degree of the offense
charged.''
11 his principle is well recognized in the law of this state
as well as in most other jurisdictions. In the case of Radej
v. State, 152 \Yisc. 503, 140 N.\Y. ~1, the rule was stated
that where hy agreement the accused is allowed to plead
guilty to a lesser offense that it i8 a bar to the prosecution
for the greater offense on a new trial. In all of the eases
dealing with this problem, it i8, of course, pointed out that
18
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the accused did agree, prior to the prosecuting attorney's
recommendation to the court, to enter a plea of guilty to
the lesser offense. Though appellant's consent does not
appear in the record, it is most logically presumed that
he did either personally or by and through his attorney
agree to plead guilty to grand larceny if the robbery
charge was dismissed. As the record points out (R. 2)
and in spite of appellant's affidavit to the contrary, he
personally appeared and waived preliminary hearing
after having answered to his true name and after a copy
of the complaint had been delivered to his attorney. On
that same day he appeared in the District Court where
he was arraigned on an information filed by the District
Attorney. The information charged appellant with grand
larceny. In open court, with his attorney present and
representing him, appellant came forward and entered a
plea of guilty to grand larceny. In appellant's affidavit
which was filed about 16 days later (R. 7) he makes great
importance of his claim that his attorney coerced him into
entering such a plea. There is no evidence or testimony
other than appellant's affidavit concerning the claimed
coercion.
In the case of Sayer v. Commonwealth, 194 Ky. 338,
238 S.W. 737, the court, referring to an individual who
later complained that he had not received the aid of
competent counsel in perfecting his defense, said:
''A defendant who is suri juris cannot complain
after the trial, for the first time, that he selected
the wrong lawyer to represent him at his triaL
If his attorney is unwilling to present his true defense, or proposes to offer a false defense, or to
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do anything which to the defendant appears at
war with the facts, with good faith, and in fair
dealing, it is the defendant's duty then to appeal
to the court, on whom he has the right to rely for
protection. If he fails to do so before the trial is
concluded, so as to give the trial judge an opportunity to assign him counsel, stop the proceedings,
and impanel a new jury or take such steps as will
insure the defendant a fair trial, the acts of his
counsel will be imputed to the defendant, who will
be regarded as sanctioning the proceedings concluded thereby.''
Appellant, though the record doesn't show it, must have
agreed to the filing of the grand larceny information; certainly through his attorney he did in fact consent and·
through his attorney, undoubtedly after consulting with
him, agreed to enter his plea of guilty to the grand larceny complaint.
There is no question about the law in Utah concerning former jeopardy. When a jury has been once impanelled and sworn the accused is placed in double jeopardy
when or if he is again called into court to answer an information charging him with a crime based upon the same
facts. However, in appellant's case the District Attorney filed with the court a new information only after the
defendant had consented to this action and had agreed
to plead guilty to grand larceny.
In the case of Amrine v. Tines, 131 F.2d 827, the
court held that where the first information is dismissed
and the accused does not seasonably object thereto, a second trial does not constitute double jeopardy. Where the
20
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accused consents to the dismissal of a jury that has been
impanelled and sworn or to the dismissal of the original
complaint and the refiling of another information and
complaint, the defense of former jeopardy is not available
to the accused. This is also the rule where the court declares a mistrial, where the accused has either given his
consent, or requested the court to so act. State v. Malouf,
287 S.W.2d 79; U. S. v. Cimino. 224 F.2d 27 4; U. S. v.
Harriman, 130 F. Supp. 198; People v. Zendan.o,136 N.Y.
Supp. 2d 106; DeYoung v. State, 27 4 S.W.2d 406 and
McLedon v. State, 74 So.2d 656. See also State v.
Crocker, 80 S.E.2d 243, 239 No. Caro. 446, where the
court held that when the accused has consented to the
actions of the court, though double jeopardy would have
attached without his consent, his consent is a bar to the:
defense of former jeopardy. The court in State v. Rowland, 239 P.2d 949, 172 Kan. 222, held that a dismissal of
a criminal case without prejudice by the county attorney
did not prejudice a new information charging accused
with the crime based upon identical facts that were the
basis of the original information filed.
Grand larceny is an included offense when the .
accused is charged with robbery in this state. State v. i
O'Day, 73 P.2d 965; State v. Davis, 76 P. 705, 28 Utah, 10.,
Since grand larceny is included in the offense of robbery,
the appellant herein could have entered a plea of guilty
to grand larceny without the District Attorney ever finding it necessary to file the second complaint. State v.
O'Day and State v. Davis, supra. It would seem to be a
very undesirable situation where, because of a minor pro21
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cedural mistake on the part of a prosecuting attorney such
as occurred in this case, the defendant in a criminal action
could be turned loose.
Appellant, instead of being prejudiced by the second
complaint, was given an unfair advantage over the State.
Based upon an affidavit filed by the appellant, the court
allowed him to change his plea from guilty to not guilty
At this point appellant was in the very enviable position of going to trial, not on the robbery charge as
originally set up, but under the lesser charge of grand
larceny-a charge he had already plead guilty to.
Appellant also claims that the court erred in refusing him the right to amend his plea to "not guilty by
reason of insanity.'' The Code of Criminal Procedure
requires that an accused, in order to use as a defense
insanity, double jeopardy, etc., must comply with the
statute. The appellant herein was not willing to place the
matter of sanity before the court. He didn't want to use
it as a defense (R. 136). Section 77-24-17, U.C.A. 1953,
provides that :
"When a defendant gices notice of the defense of
insanity the court may select and appoint two
alienists to examine the defendant and investigate
his sanity • • • ''

rrhe time referred to in this section in which notice must
be given is set out under 77-22-16, U.C.A. 1953, which
reads as follows :
"Whenever a defendant shall propose to offer in
his defense evidence that he is not guilty by rea-
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son of insanity, such defendant shall at the time
of the arraignment, or within ten days thereafter,.
but not less than four days before the trial of such
cause, file and serve upon the prosecuting attorney
in such cause, notice in writing of his intention to
claim such defense. If the defandant fails to file
such notice, he shall not be entitled to introduce
evidence tending to establish such defense. The
court may, however, permit such evidence to be
introduced where good cause for the failure to
file notice has been made to appear."
Appellant failed to give notice as required, and therefore it was within the discretion of the court to refuse to
allow him to amend his plea after the trial had commenced. Also the court had knowledge of appellant's
recent stay in the State Hospital at Provo and was also
aware of the fact that if he were insane he would still be
there. The record also contained an order issuing from
the Third District Court stating that the Hospital had
certified appellant to be sane and directing the Sheriff of
Salt Lake County to return him to the Salt Lake County
Jail and to there await trial ( R. 71).
The law in this state is settled regarding a person's
sanity. It is that all persons are presumed to be sane.
State v. Hadley, 65 Utah 109, 234 P. 940; State v. Green,
78 Utah 580, 6 P.2d 177. This presumption applies also
when the person has been discharged from a mental hospital, assuming, of course, that the person was discharged
as being sane. Cannon v. Commonwealth, 243 Ky. 302,
47 S.W.2d 1075. Even though it may be shown that the
accused may have been insane at the time the criminal
offense occurred ,where he had lucid intervals it is pre23
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snmed that the crime was committed during such a lucid
interval unless there is proof to the contrary. State v.
Peterson, ........ Mo ......... , 154 S.W. 2d 134. Appellant
herein has never introduced any evidence to show that he
was not sane at the time the robbery took place in 1954
and, as the court order indicates, he was certified as sane
when he was returned to the County Jail. Therefore, the
court did not abuse its discretion when it refused the
appellant's motion to change his plea to not guilty by
reason of insanity.

POINT III
APPELLANT WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO CONFRONT THE
WITNESSES AGAINST HIM.
The record discloses that Wayne Luck was called
qy the State and did testify to the fact that he was one of
t~e victims of the robbery that the jury found appellant
to have committed. He also testified to the fact that the
watch that had been taken from him had been purchased
just a year prior to the robbery and at the time of the
robbery was worth $50.00. He indicated in his testimony
that he would not have sold it for anything less than
$50.00 since it had cost him originally $73.00.
In the case of stolen property the value is usually
determined by what the property's market value would
have been at the time of the larceny, and where it would
be difficult to determine the value, as in the case of certain jewelry and other personal property, the testimony
24
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of the owner may be accepted as establishing a value for
the property. State v. Moll, 112 Kan. 63, 209 P. 820; In

Re Spaulding, 75 Kan. 163, 88 P. 547. Mr. Luck also··
testified to the fact that besides his watch his wallet was'
also stolen and contained something less than $20.00, and
that his glasses were also taken and had a market value.
of $30.00 since it cost him that amount to replace them.
Therefore, Mr. Luck's testimony was to the fact that from
him personally the robbers took well in excess of $50.00
worth of personal property. (R. 152, 153).
The appellant objects very strongly to the facts that
Luck was asked certain questions regarding State Exhibit
No. 3, which was another watch, the State claiming that
it had been taken from Dean Jones on the night of the
robbery. A careful reading of the record (R. 181-183) will
disclose that Luck at no time testified as to the value of
that watch, nor to anything Jones may have said
about his watch, only to the fact that Exhibit No. 3 had
the same general appearance as the watch that Jones wa,f;'.
wearing on the night of the robbery. His testimony is
not hearsay; it is a disclosure of his own observations,
and that alone. Both the watch identified by Mr. Luck as
his and the one he had identified as having the same general appearance as the one owned by Jones were identified
by the next witness, Mr. Marion F. Barnett, the police
officer from Twin Falls, Idaho, as the watches found
secreted on the appellant's person (R. 186).
25
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In the case of State v. Johnson, 37 New Mex. 280, 21
P.2d 813, 89 ALR 1368, the court declared that articles
found in the possession of the accused are admissible
when such articles of property have been identified as
belonging to the victims or victim of the crime. See also
State v. Leftwich, 216 Iowa 1226, 250 N.W. 489. It is also
relevant to show that following the commission of the
crime the defendant had possession of specific articles
which were later identified as belonging to the victims.
People v. Collins, 64 Calif. 293, 30 P. 847; State v. Barnes,
47 Ore. 592, 85 P. 998. Therefore, respondent believes that
the appellant did have the opportunity of facing the witnesses against him, of cross-examining them, of objecting
to all evidence presented by the State, and therefore did
not have his right abridged whereby he was entitled to
face the witness against him.
POINT IV
APPELLANT WAS XOT DEPRIVED OF HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO CO~IPEL THE
A':rTENDANCE OF \YITXESSES IX HIS 0\YN" BEHALF.
Appellant makes the claim that his attorney was not
given sufficient time to subpoena witnesses in his behalf.
However, in the record and the brief submitted by appellant there is no claim that he eYer gave the names to ~Ir.
Ashworth, who was representing him at that time. Since
there had been scYcn days bebYecu the time of ~Ir. Ashworth's appointment and the date of trial, there was more
than ample time to ha ,.c had issued subpoenas for appellant's witnesses. The record discloses (R. ~73-~76), that
26
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the court informed appellant that he could contact those
named by him as witnesses and, in fact, issued an order
whereby the deputy who would take custody of the appellant and return him to the County Jail was informed
that appellant was to have the privilege of phoning the
people named at that particular time. The next day when
it came time for the appellant to put on his case, he informed the court that he had not been able to get in touch
with any of his important witnesses and therefore was
willing to let one man that did appear go since his testimony was not apparently very relevant to the defense
appellant hoped to establish (R. 281).
The order referred to by appellant that was issued by
Judge Lewis Jones was made not during any criminal
proceeding, but during a hearing on a writ of habeas
corpus. This order was later modified by Judge Jones
(R. 51) wherein he directed the clerk to enter an order
that all orders issued by him at the habeas corpus hearing
were to be subject to modification by the criminal division
of the Third District Court.
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POINT V
'rHE VERDICT AND JUDGMENT IS NOT CONTRARY TO THE LAW AND EVIDENCE AND DOES
NOT VIOLATE THE APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.
The appellant objects to the instruction given by the
court regarding the value of the property taken. Instruction 6 informed the jury that:
'< ·

''You are instructed in determining the value of
the property alleged to have been taken from
Jones and Lewis as charged in the information
you may add the total value of the property together in determining its value as to whether or
not it exceeds the sum of $50.00 lawful money of
the United States or is equal to or under $50.00."
The law has been long established that where different
articles are stolen at the same time, it is but one transaction and the aggregate value of all the articles deterttnnes the grade of the offense. State v. JfcKee, 17 Utah
3l70, 53 P. 733; State v. Mickel, 23 Utah 507, 65 P. 484;
Ackerman v. State, 7 Wyoming 504, 54 P. 228; State v.
1llandich, 24 Nev. 336, 54 P. 516; People '· Reghetti, 66
Calif. 184, 4 P. 1185. Therefore, there was no error in
the instruction given by the court. Also where the accused
is in possession of certain valuable property after the
commission of the crime, it is relevant where the crime
was committed for pecuniary gain and where there is
evidence that the accused was not likely to have owned
such property prior to that time.
Appellant also complains that he was accused of
28
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stealing from Dean Jones and Wayne Luck by the information and therefore Dean Jones should have been present during the trial.
In the case of State v. McKee, supra, the court said
this concerning the name of the owner of stolen property
appearing in an information or indictment:
''The name of the owner of stolen property is not
a part of the crime. It is stated in indictments
and informations as a matter of description,as to the particular species of stock or animals
stolen, or as the kind, quality or peculiarity of
other personal property taken may be mentioned.
* • * The name of the owner is mentioned for the
purpose of identification only.''
The appellant in examining Mr. Luck, brought out the
fact that the bill of particular furnished Mr. Lee Hobbs,
when he was acting as appellant's counsel, stated that the
property taken from Luck had a total valuation of·
approximately $22.00. However, appellant brought out
the fact that Luck had not been asked about the value of
the property when the bills of particular were furnished
and therefore the figures thus supplied must give way to
the actual testimony of Mr. Luck during the trial. Also
appellant tries to make a great event of the fact that the·
watches that were introduced as evidence had been
changed in some respects, i.e. the replacing of the torn
wrist bands. However, we feel this is of little consequence
since the watches were properly identified as the ones
found on appellant; there was no material change in the
appearance of the watch and the testimony of Luck
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placed a value on his watch that met the minimum amount
fixed by statute for grand larceny and since the watches
had been returned to the parties from whom they had
been. taken with the permission of the court. There was
no abuse of the court's discretion since the watches
were properly identified and marked.

CONCLUSION
The judgment of the lower court should be affirmed.
Respectfully, submitted,

E. R. CALLISTER
Attorney General
MAURICE D. JONES
Ass·istant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

30

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

